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France has always been among the leading wine-producing
countries in the world, and the French wine industry represents
a total amount of 95,400 wine growers. Wine exports are one
of the strong points of the French economy: the contribution of
wine exports to the French Trade Balance regularly exceeds €6
billion (Onivin Viniﬂhor, 2009), although the French Trade
Balance was negative in 2009 with a €41 billion deﬁcit
(INSEE: Tableaux de l'Economie Française, 2009).
We know that ﬁrms in the French wine industry apply
different marketing strategies for their business operations. Some
ﬁrms, particular large ones, often prefer to offer standardized and
mass-produced products adapted to many geographic markets
and to cater to large supermarket chains, and may be termed
mass-market ﬁrms. Others prefer to specialize and adapt their
production to the needs of narrow markets, and emphasizing the
importance of terroir, appellation and geographical identity to
enhance product quality. This latter strategy, typically character-
ized by specialization, narrow markets and long-term relation-
ships, is often termed niche strategy (Dalgic and Leeuw, 1994),
and may be described as “the process of carving out, protecting
and offering a valued product to a narrow part of a market that
displays differentiated needs” (Toften and Hammervoll, 2013,
p. 280). Such niche marketing has been claimed to be beneﬁcial
for some ﬁrms in terms of increased proﬁts, higher prices, higher
growth, increased market shares and increased competitiveness/10.1016/j.wep.2014.11.001
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nder responsibility of Wine Economics and Policy.(e.g. Toften and Hammervoll, 2013). These two marketing
strategies – niche and mass-market – have thus different
implications in terms of choice of market and differentiation,
product, price, marketing channels, and communication.
National income does inﬂuence food and beverage product
trade (ul Haq, 2013), and the international wine market, like
other markets, has been suffering since the start of the ﬁnancial
crisis in 2008. After twenty years of almost uninterrupted
growth, the market recorded a strong downturn from the fourth
quarter of 2008: three per cent at the world level and four per
cent for European exports, according to the ofﬁcial ﬁgures
released by I.O.V. (International Organization of Vine and
Wine). This means that the overall demand for wine, in value,
has decreased. However, we know less in terms of the nuances
of this change in demand. For example, has the demand
changed in terms of willingness to pay for wine directed at the
high-end market or for wine in terms of volume? In other
words, have people switched their purchase from expensive
Grand Crus wine to less expensive mass-market wine or just
reduced the amount of purchased wine in general? On the
other hand, the volume wine sold in the hyper- and super
markets, accounting for 80% of the sales in France, has
decreased, as shown in Table 1. Sales in supermarkets (liters
per week per shop) have decreased by 14.4% in the 2006–2013
period.
It would be beneﬁcial to both the French and the interna-
tional wine industry to understand which of the two marketing
strategies – the niche strategy or the mass-market strategy has
been most successful during the times of the ﬁnancial crisis.
Such knowledge could form the basis for offering guidelines
for both mass-market ﬁrms as well as for niche ﬁrms, and forlsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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paper is thus to study how niche ﬁrms and mass-market ﬁrms
in the French wine industry have performed relative to each
other during the ﬁnancial crisis.
In the remaining sections of this paper a brief description of
the choice of setting and industry is offered, followed by the
methodology, which presents background about the population
and sample, variables used for this study, and the method of
data collection. Then the statistical analysis applied for this
research is presented, as well as the discussion of its results.
This paper then continues with the conclusion and implications
of this research, followed by pinpointing some of its limita-
tions and providing recommendations for future research.
2. The wine merchant system of “La Place De Bordeaux”
Initially it is necessary to understand the very particular
behavior of La Place de Bordeaux. Two major categories of
players drive this market. First, the Grand Cru Châteaux, most
of which are members of the Union des Grands Crus (about
140 Châteaux) in ﬁve terroirs (Saint-Emilion, Medoc, Graves,
Pessac-Léognan, Sauternes) focusing on the high-quality
market. Traditionally, these Châteaux do not market their
wine and they entrust the mission to traders, most of them
located in Bordeaux. Marketing then proceeds in this manner:
in the spring following the harvest, a marketing campaign
called en primeur sets the price of wine and the allocation, that
is to say the number of cases each Château offers each
merchant. If the merchant accepts the offer, the merchant pays
for the order and must wait for the aging of the wine, whichSt Emilion
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Table 1
Total sales in France (liters per week per shop).
Source: IRIS for Agrimer 2014.
Year 2007 2010 2013
Supermarket 1480 1429 1413
Hypermarket 6617 5998 5661typically lasts 18 months, before having it delivered and, in
turn, the trader markets the stock for buyers who usually are
located abroad. This system provides a “win–win” situation,
providing cash to the Château and a price guarantee to the
merchant.
The second category consists of chateaux that generally
focus on wine with a modest quality and apply a more “mass-
market” orientation. This category typically selects the wines,
creates blendings, bottles the bulk, and then, promotes and
markets its own brands or brands dedicated to the hyper- or
supermarkets. The blendings are made by their enologists and
give the real identity to the wines supplied by various
producers.
There are thus two main categories of merchants on the La
Place de Bordeaux: those who are part of the allocation
system and generate a signiﬁcant part of their business on more
speculative sales based on expectations on future development
of their wine, and those who produce and sell their ﬁnished
product at the spot market, often targeting the quality level
required by large and uniform markets. The Grand Crus
Chateaux' strategy is based on an elitist approach as they use
separate distribution channels and have more exporting com-
petence, thanks to their powerful Networks. In this paper the
former category is termed niche ﬁrms, because their business is
niche oriented, while the latter category is termed mass-market
ﬁrms. See Fig. 1 for an illustrated overview. Niche ﬁrms are
associated with Grand Crus, while ﬁrms with a mass-market
strategy are associated with non Grand Crus.
3. Methodology
3.1. Research design and data collection
Natural experiments investigate the effects of treatments that
are not manipulative by the researchers, such as for example
government interventions, or policy changes (Shadish et al.,
2002). Over the last decades, the natural experimental
approach has gained considerable attention in economics,Niche
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Fig. 2. The two business models of “La Place de Bordeaux”.
Table 2
Overview of variables.
1. Turnover 5. Shareholder equity
2. Number of employees 6. Ratio of net proﬁt/shareholder equity
3. Value added 7. The export rate in per cent
4. Net result 8. The ratio of value added/turnover
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Moorman, 1996). One major advantage of a natural experi-
ment is that it can provide higher validity on causal inferences
than can purely statistical adjustments (Shadish et al., 2002).
A control group, that allows us to control for the time trend
or other threats to internal validity, is not possible in our case,
since all ﬁrms are faced with the same ﬁnancial crisis (global
phenomenon). Therefore, it is difﬁcult to assess the conse-
quences of the ﬁnancial crisis per se. However, by comparing
niche ﬁrms to other ﬁrms in the wine industry, it is possible to
compare how two distinct groups have performed relative to
each other during the time of ﬁnancial crisis. This study is
concerned with two time periods; namely before and after
2008, when the ﬁnancial crisis hit, and may thus be described
as a longitudinal study.
The data is collected from two sources: ﬁrst, the Union des
Maisons de Négoce de Bordeaux, which includes most of the
merchants of Bordeaux vineyards. This organization publishes
an annual directory that separates its members into two groups:
those engaged in a speculative activity, mainly in connection
with the Châteaux Grand Crus (termed niche ﬁrms), and those
who have a model based on a non-speculative purchase of
wine directed at a wider market (termed mass-market ﬁrms)
Fig. 2.
Then, for each of the companies of our sample, we collected
ﬁnancial data from the ﬁnancial database Dun and Bradstreet.
In order to observe the performance during the ﬁnancial crisis
for these two groups, we collected data for one year prior to
the ﬁnancial crisis (2007) and for two different years after the
start of the ﬁnancial crisis (2009 and 2011), for identifying
possible near- as well as longer-term effects.3.2. Variables
Selected variables were applied in order to provide a broad
picture of the ﬁnancial performance of the two groups, as
shown in Table 2.
Turnover and number of employees give a ﬁrst picture of
the size of the company. Furthermore, by observing their
evolution over the three years, we can deduce the resistance to
the crisis in terms of groups. Value added, net result, and
shareholder equity are included to provide broad performance
data. Then the rate of net proﬁt/shareholder equity of the
company provides a conventional measure of the proﬁtability
of the company. Moreover, the export rate seems essential to
study because the niche market of Grands Crus is mainly
located outside France. Finally, to better measure the con-
tribution of the company in its sector and its robustness over
the longer term, the ratio of value added/turnover is included.
We have not included treasury or cash ratio, nor inventory
turnover, since the two groups are not comparable on these
criteria due to their different business models.3.3. Sample description
Descriptive statistics for the ﬁrms for three years are shown
in Tables 3–5.
The Grand Crus ﬁrms target a narrow market, practise
specialization when it comes to both the product quality and
the marketing channels, as well as relationship marketing
directed at a limited number of customer, i.e. traders, and
have internal capabilities and effective barriers based on the
classiﬁcation as a Grand Crus Châteaux (Classement de
1855). The larger, referral market, is characterized by ﬁrms
with large volumes (this market consists of 95% of the total
produced volume) and has no particular protective barriers or
specialization in place. In total, these characteristics support
the view that the Grand Crus ﬁrms adjourn to the requirements
of niche ﬁrms, as suggested by Toften and Hammervoll
(2013), while the other ﬁrms could be classiﬁed as generalist
or mass-market ﬁrms.4. Analysis and results
4.1. Statistical test
Kruskal and Wallis (1952) is a nonparametric statistical test
that assesses the differences for some non-normally distributed
continuous variables among groups. In contrast, the one-way
analysis of variance (ANOVA), which is a parametric test, may
be used for a normally distributed continuous variable, if the
groups are of similar size. Thus, the Kruskal–Wallis is the
nonparametric version of the one-way ANOVA, and is used
here because the numbers of observations in the two groups
are not of similar magnitude (around 40 observations for niche
ﬁrms and less than half of that for mass-market ﬁrms).
Table 3
Descriptive statistics; 2007.
Niche ﬁrms Mass-market ﬁrms
N Mean Std. deviation N Mean Std. deviation
Turnover 41 34703998.85 74906785.45 16 67475910.81 118739913.11
Number of employees 29 72.83 154.86 13 91.23 138.41
Value added 41 5678499.85 14367716.01 16 6751036.63 8904576.13
Net result 41 692870.39 3035049.60 16 1162609.25 2379350.60
Shareholder equity 41 4173551.32 12721420.66 16 3838360.87 6446878.23
Net proﬁt/shareholder equity 41 1.44 4.20 16 2.37 3.35
Export rate (%) 41 49.50 30.73 16 39.93 34.08
Value added/turnover 41 16.80 16 10.01
Table 4
Descriptive statistics; 2009.
Niche ﬁrms Mass-market ﬁrms
N Mean Std. deviation N Mean Std. deviation
Turnover 39 38176275.97 100528303.91 16 74464517.75 145489369.45
Number of employees 24 89.17 225.49 11 104.73 142.91
Value added 39 5997281.77 17662139.97 16 6986711.13 9426935.79
Net result 39 1045579.36 3986481.39 16 1589080.88 3280915.73
Shareholder equity 39 4373354.38 12891427.34 16 3838360.87 6446878.23
Net proﬁt/shareholder equity 39 .32 5.58 16 2.47 4.25
Export rate (%) 39 52.19 27.77 16 43.44 35.73
Value added/turnover 39 17.53 16 9.38
Table 5
Descriptive statistics; 2011.
Niche ﬁrms Mass-market ﬁrms
N Mean Std. deviation N Mean Std. deviation
Turnover 41 44930417.73 112132802.09 13 95470743.15 184829377.41
Number of employees 33 70.42 195.05 10 110.30 156.48
Value added 41 6944052.39 18348278.22 13 8491715.38 10504638.51
Net result 41 1351964.44 3810868.43 13 1783979.08 3142355.11
Shareholder equity 41 4391029.54 12911538.46 13 2814324.15 3660538.57
Net proﬁt/shareholder equity 41 1.49 4.62 13 2.91 3.27
Export rate (%) 40 52.38 30.32 13 47.75 35.09
Value added/turnover 41 15.73 13 8.90
Table 6
Test statisticsa for 2007–2009.
Turn
over
Value
added
Net
result
Share holder
equity
Staff Net
proﬁt
Export
rate (%)
Chi-
square
.137 3.786 2.143 .795 1.502 2.782 .057
Df 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Asymp.
sig.
.711 .052 .143 .373 .220 .095 .812
aKruskal Wallis Test
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As Table 6 shows, there was a signiﬁcant difference in the
change in value added (po .10) and the change in net proﬁts
(po .10) from 2007 to 2009 for the two groups of ﬁrms. For
niche ﬁrms, value added increased on the average from 5.7
million (2007) to 6.0 million (2009). For mass-market ﬁrms,
the increase was from 6.8 million to 7.0 million. The relative
increase in value added is therefore stronger for niche ﬁrms.
Table 7
Test Statisticsa for 2007–2011.
Turn
over
Value
added
Net
result
Share holder
equity
Staff Net
proﬁt
Export
rate (%)
Chi-
square
1.756 .030 2.211 .725 .613 3.733 2.125
Df 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Asymp.
sig.
.185 .863 .137 .395 .434 .053 .145
aKruskal Wallis Test.
Table 8
Test Statisticsa for 2007.
Turn
over
Value
added
Net
result
Share holder
equity
Staff Net
proﬁt
Export
rate (%)
Chi-
square
1.061 .954 1.333 .284 .409 .837 .921
Df 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Asymp.
sig.
.303 .329 .248 .594 .522 .360 .337
aKruskal Wallis Test
Table 9
Test Statisticsa for 2009.
Turn
over
Value
added
Net
result
Share holder
equity
Staff Net
proﬁt
Export
rate (%)
Chi-
square
.859 1.731 2.540 .042 1.777 1.195 .578
Df 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Asymp.
sig.
.354 .188 .111 .838 .183 .274 .447
aKruskal Wallis Test.
Table 10
Test statisticsa for 2011.
Turn
over
Value
added
Net
result
Share holder
equity
Staff Net
proﬁt
Export
rate (%)
Chi-
square
.885 1.261 .332 .266 2.368 .671 .096
Df 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Asymp.
sig.
.347 .261 .564 .606 .124 .413 .756
aKruskal Wallis Test.
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2007, but only .3% in 2009. For mass-market ﬁrms, net proﬁts
slightly increased, from 2.4% (2007) to 2.5% (2009). The
development in net proﬁt is therefore signiﬁcantly different for
the two groups of ﬁrms.
There was a signiﬁcant difference in the change in net
proﬁts (po .10) from 2007 to 2011 for the two groups of
ﬁrms, as shown in Table 7. For niche ﬁrms, the net proﬁt was,
on the average 1.4% in 2007, and 1.5% in 2011. Net proﬁt
increased for mass-market ﬁrms, from 2.4% (2007) to 2.9%
(2011). The development in net proﬁt is therefore signiﬁcantly
different for the two groups of ﬁrms.
4.3. Control-variables
In an attempt to address alternative explanations for
observed changes in the two groups, we tested whether the
two groups differed in any way with regard to important ﬁrm
characteristics, in terms of turnover, value added, net result,
shareholder equity, number of employees, net proﬁt and export
rate. Neither of these tests shows signiﬁcant differences
between niche and mass-market ﬁrms for either of these years.
The results of these tests are shown in Tables 8–10.
5. Discussion
The purpose of this paper is to identify which of the two
strategies of niche versus mass-market strategies has resulted
in the better performance data during the time of the ﬁnancial
crisis. The results show that most of the selected ﬁnancial
performance measures did not show statistical signiﬁcant
differences between niche and mass-market ﬁrms. Resistance
to the crisis seems thus to characterize the two groups of ﬁrmssimilarly both in terms of growth of sales, net proﬁt, and
export rates. Establishing the reason for this overall result is
beyond the scope of this current study, but it is reasonable to
expect that both the niche and the mass-market strategies, by
and large, have proved to be two alternative and viable tracks
for combating the effects of the ﬁnancial crisis.
However, for the period from 2007 to 2009 there are two
signiﬁcant differences between these groups (po .10). First,
the value added for niche ﬁrms increased on average from 5.7
million (2007) to 6.0 million Euros (2009), while the increase
for mass-market ﬁrms was from 6.8 million to 7.0 million
Euros. The relative increase in value added is thus somewhat
stronger for niche ﬁrms. One possible explanation for this high
level of valued added is provided by the prices on the Grands
Crus in 2008 and 2009, where these years were characterized
by high quality products paired with high prices.
Second, net proﬁt/shareholder equity for niche ﬁrms was on
the average 1.4% in 2007, but only .3% in 2009. For mass-
market ﬁrms, net proﬁts/shareholder equity slightly increased,
from 2.4% (2007) to 2.5% (2009). This development in net
proﬁt/shareholder equity is signiﬁcantly different for the two
groups of ﬁrms (po .10), indicating that niche ﬁrms suffered
relatively more than mass-market ﬁrms on the short term.
Business investments and a stronger presence of the sales
teams in Asia to raise awareness of the world of Grand Crus in
this new market may explain the lower proﬁtability of niche
businesses.
For the longer time period, from 2007 to 2011, only the
change in net proﬁt/shareholder equity (po .10) shows a
statistical signiﬁcant difference between these two groups.
For niche ﬁrms the net proﬁt/shareholder equity was, on the
average, 1.4% in 2007 and 1.5% in 2011, while net proﬁt
increased for mass-market ﬁrms from 2.4% to 2.9% during the
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have managed to recover from the results in 2009 and to about
the same level as in 2007, but they still show signiﬁcant lower
results compared to mass-market ﬁrms, as they also did before
the crisis. Because of the speculation that is exerted on the
Grand Crus, it is difﬁcult to estimate the level of margins of
this business niche. Indeed, similar levels of ﬁrm efforts can
lead to varying ﬁnancial results from one year to another, and
this may be the case here.
Further, when scrutinizing the results more closely, one can
identify that on the one hand, the rate of net proﬁt/shareholder
equity appears higher among mass-market ﬁrms, with around
2% instead of 1%. One possible explanation for this lower
ﬁnancial return for niche companies could be excessive
funding of the niche ﬁrms, compared to the mass-market ﬁrms.
On the other hand, the rate of value added/turnover seems to
be highest for niche ﬁrms on average around 16% instead of
9%. This ratio enforces the key role of this type of actor in the
industry and its robustness in maintaining its position.
Beyond these observations it is relevant to pinpoint that
differences in performance could be explained by the choice of
marketing and business model. The “mass-market” model is
often an industrial type, with an important immobilized asset
and large marketing budgets. The niche model here is more
based on the network of relationships maintained by the traders
of the Châteaux.6. Conclusions
6.1. Main conclusion
The objective of this paper is to study how niche ﬁrms and
mass-market ﬁrms in the French wine industry have performed
relative to each other during the ﬁnancial crisis. In general, our
ﬁndings imply that on most ﬁnancial performance measures
these two very different marketing strategies of niche versus
mass-market ﬁrms both performed rather well. There was,
though, an immediate drop in some measures in 2009, just
after the start of the crisis, but these had improved by 2011,
suggesting that the ﬁnancial crisis only had temporary effects.
In other words, resistance to the crisis seems to characterize the
two groups of ﬁrms rather similarly in terms of sales growth,
net proﬁt, and export rates.
However, for the period from 2007 to 2009 two signiﬁcant
differences between these groups were identiﬁed. First, the
value added for niche ﬁrms increased on average slightly more
than mass-market ﬁrms during this ﬁrst part of the crisis.
Second, net proﬁt for niche ﬁrms dropped from 2007 to 2009,
while mass-market ﬁrms on the contrary managed to increase
this margin – in this ﬁrst phase of the crisis.
In the longer period, from 2007 to 2011, there was only one
ﬁnancial performance measure which remained statistically
signiﬁcantly different between the two groups; change in net
proﬁts. Although the niche ﬁrms then also had regained the
margin from 2007, the mass-market ﬁrms had increased
even more.The overall conclusion is that, despite a few nuances, it is a
draw between niche and mass-market ﬁrms in respect to
handling the time of the ﬁnancial crisis – both groups of ﬁrms
have managed the ﬁnancial crisis rather well, despite pursuing
quite different marketing strategies.
6.2. Managerial implications
The analysis indicates that either strategy seems to have
worked rather well during this period. This supports the view
that ﬁrms could choose either one of these to be prepared for
later crises, and it is probably most fruitful to make the choice
of marketing strategy based on internal strategic or dynamic
capabilities, according to general strategy theory (e.g. Teece
et al., 1997; Winter, 2003).
The companies specialized in the trading of Grand Crus
have a strong ability to be present on a very narrow market: it
represents only 5% of the volume sold by the Bordeaux
producers of Bordeaux wines, and a substantial portion of this
is sold internationally, especially to Asia and the US. There-
fore, the main key to success to enter or remain in this ﬁeld
consists of developing a network of relationships with traders
who will engage in negotiations, especially during en primeurs
campaigns and during the allocation negotiation. In other
words; it is essential to have strong customer relationships for
capturing the beneﬁts of niche marketing, and is necessary to
be both product-oriented, in order to create top quality
products, and to be customer-oriented, in order to develop
customer relationships and understand customers' needs, fol-
lowing Toften and Hammervoll's (2010) recommendations.
Further, the popularity and, hence, demand for niche
products in the times prior to the ﬁnancial crisis was to a
large degree based on increasing demand from Asia in general
and from China in particular. It would be prudent of niche
ﬁrms to take into consideration that this demand was excep-
tionally high, and to plan for a lower increase in demand for
the future. More generally, niche ﬁrms should consider
strengthen their risk management capacity (see e.g. Quon
et al., 2012). For ﬁrms in the mass-market, preparations for a
future crisis could consist of fortifying their position now.
Faced with competition from New World countries French
merchants could focus on the following; to increase awareness
and understanding of the speciﬁcs of blending grape varieties,
to develop more readable identity based on land productions,
to have a greater expertise in exports, and to have greater
proximity with the end market. Such efforts should include a
concern for reputational factors, recognizing the strong inﬂu-
ence of wine critics (Hay, 2010). Further, it would beneﬁcial to
focus on relative low item costs in production. Finally, French
merchants could develop some global wine brands based on
their own qualities and carried by strong marketing channel
intermediaries and powerful retail groups.
6.3. Study limitations and further research
First, this study examined a limited number of ﬁrms, in a
limited geographic area and in a single industry. This limited
T. Hammervoll et al. / Wine Economics and Policy 3 (2014) 108–114114data means that generalizing the ﬁndings to a larger population
is difﬁcult, even though there still are lessons here to be learnt
for ﬁrms preparing for the next crisis. Second, although the
grouping of ﬁrms to either mass-market or niche ﬁrms are
conducted in an acceptable manner, this may still be more
nuanced and based more comprehensively on the deﬁnition of
niche marketing as presented in this paper. Third, we were not
able to analyze the effects of speculation (time lag between the
futures sales and delivery) on proﬁts. Forth, we have rather
limited access to ﬁnancial performance data in that only data
for three years (2007, 2009, and 2011) are available for
analysis. Finally, it is a limitation that ﬁrms can alter the
composition of their offerings, e.g. by offering more as vin de
pays, and less as Grand cru (which leads to less Grand cru for
sale, and higher prices – the price compensates for decreased
volume). We were not able to analyze such effects in
this study.
In order to pinpointing avenues for future research possibi-
lities it feels natural to suggest including more ﬁnancial
performance data from other wine ﬁrms located in other
French regions or abroad. Second, it is possible to include
other industries. Another French market niche which often is
associated with that of the Grand Crus is the Haute Couture.
This sector is also dedicated to a narrow and international
market. It would be interesting to compare the ﬁnancial data of
these two business sectors to see whether their resistance were
similar or not during the crisis, and secondly, to add similar
ﬁnancial performance data in order to strengthen external
validity of this present study.
A third avenue for future research could be to strengthen
theory building of niche marketing and its applications. By
conducting a larger qualitative study of wine ﬁrms within the
niche theory setting this could contribute to enhance niche
theory in terms of deﬁnitions and its operationalizations.References
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